AFRICA: IN SEARCH OF SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

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Overview

This article analyses the features of African countries in relations to security and spotlights its security threats from the Cold War era. The current regional security frameworks for promoting peace and stability are also examined. Since Africa falls within the new entrants into the international system, all the countries on the continent south of the Sahara, perhaps with exception of Republic of South Africa, typified by economic underdevelopment, increasing inequity in wealth and income distributions, social and ethno-religious conflicts, fragile political institutions/instability, pressure from galloping population growth, social and moral decadence, neo-patrimonialism and clientelist system, etc, ultimately, constitute the security quagmires of these societies. In this study, the word *security* is operationalised in a wider context. It transcends the traditional realist militaro-political conception; rather it looks at security in multidimensional facets [Badmus, 2005: 87; Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, 1988: 281].

Therefore, security is seen beyond political order which protect both individuals and states against immediate threats of physical violence. It encompasses socio-economic order which is more relevant to the concept today than before. Regional security, by extension, is the summation of national security of nation-states and individuals in a particular region [against both internal an external threats] defined largely in political, economic, and social terms.

Regardless of the controversies surrounding the meaning of the concept, it is widely acknowledged that security also includes *everything* that

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affect people negatively. Central to this study, is the debate on whether the security thinking of the Cold War years still hold-sway in this post-Cold War period. This becomes fundamental considering the fact that most of the issues that were formerly relegated to the background have occupied the centre stage in international relations and are, of course, vital to the post-1989 Africa's security calculus. Security issues such as drug-trafficking, informal trade and smuggling, money laundering, banditry and urban crimes, are some of the contemporary Africa's security challenges. In the light of the foregoing, it is essential to preoccupy ourselves with the following critical questions, for our conviction that the preservation of human lives needs a security guarantee. First, what are the Africa's security challenges during and after the Cold War? Second, is the previous 'state-centric' security thinking developed wholly in the realist conception of inter-state relations an appropriate model for transcending Africa's security quandaries? Third, what are the security arrangements put forward by Africans themselves to secure their continent from the scourge of inter- and intra-state conflicts, and how effective are these arrangements? Fourth, are there extra-African influences on the Africa's security arrangements? Fifth, what are the impacts of colonialism/neo-colonialism, and Cold War on Africa's security arrangements? Sixth, how effectively has each African government's confrontation of threats to their state's cohesion and territorial integrity been? Seventh, how 'central' is people/human-beings in the Africa's security calculus? etc. These research conundrums will be meaningfully addressed by, first of all, explaining the meaning of our central concept, security, in relations to Africa.

Africa's security: what it is and what it is not

Security refers to a situation where people are free from danger, fear, or uncertainty. Living without immediate fears and threats is regarded as the very basis of human coexistence and development. This conceptualisation reflects the realist view that defines security in highly military sense. To all appearances, this explanation aptly captures the security situation of the developed countries but inadequate for the Third World Countries [TWCs], particularly Africa. The poser then becomes; why has the realist postulation failed to capture the African situation? The reason for this is

not too far-fetched for there are well established socio-economic and political orders in the West that enabled governments to narrow their security concerns to the protection of the state from external threats and aggressions. Therefore, security, not surprisingly, is viewed both from military and political perspectives; a reflection of the East--West ideological consternation between the United States and its allies, and the former USSR with its satellite Eastern European bloc of the post-World War II international politics. Contrastingly, Africa is at the periphery of the international system where poverty, political vendetta/ instability, failing institutions, social decadence have been its recurring decimal. In this socio-economic and political set-up, the conceptualisation of security in the power politics paradigm is tantamount to self immolation for the greatest challenge to Africa's security, especially in this post-Cold War period, is economic insecurity. It is in this context that this paper agrees with the notion that security has to be seen in a broad sense so as to make it more meaningful and capture the realities of contemporary Africa. Thus, while this study concurs with the realist theses, the fact still remains that, economic insecurity and threats emanating there-from account for most of the conflicts in Africa today.

At the heart of the security discourse is human being/people. Going by this postulation, the ex-United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, noted in his Millennium Report that while traditional security policy had focused on securing the territory of states from external aggression, it has shifted to the "protection of individuals from internal violence" [Annan, 2000]. Thus, focusing on the protection of individuals rather than borders is the central element of what has become known as 'human security' [Andrew, 2002: 4]. Thus, a more broadened concept of security is interpreted as a situation where individuals and the state are protected against external and internal threats. This encompasses both military and non-military threats. Security is seen as a double--edged sword. At one level, we have the internal security that implies protection of the citizens against politico-economic threats. This implies people security satisfaction of the social, cultural, economic, political and human rights which are the basic needs as well as the security of the regime against internal threats. It is important to stress the fact that the security of the government is a func-

tion of how the people are secured with respect to their socio-cultural, political, and economic needs. External security on the other hand refers to the protection of the territorial integrity of the African states from external aggression so as to safeguard the national interests of individual countries. Thus, what is apparent is that the protection of state against external aggression preoccupied the minds of policy makers/analysts during the East-West Cold War period and regarded as the security thinking of the epoch. This has enabled the state and its authority to conceptualise national security in highly militarised terms by putting more emphasis on armament building. The end of the Cold War doused tensions between the two super powers and by extension subdued the proxy wars on the African soil. The basic challenge to the continent now is that of economic insecurity. By economic security, we mean the existence of political stability, under which a nation can produce, accumulate and distribute its resources—natural, manufactured and human, is central to national security [Badmus, 2005: 87].

What is germane from the foregoing discussions is that Africa's security is seen beyond politico-military realm. The economic crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the hardships brought by the adoption and implementation of the World Bank [the Bank] and the International Monetary Fund [IMF] inspired Structural Adjustment Programmes [SAPs] to the people/citizens of the adjusting states in Africa constitute the greatest challenge to the security of the continent [Badmus, 2006: 275-279]. This is because the failure of the governments to satisfy the socio-economic needs of their citizens has compelled people to take certain unwholesome acts to make a living, which is oftentimes, detrimental to Africa's security. Thus, "persistent underdevelopment and deprivation of economic well-being degrade national morale and precipate social unrest, thus furthering internal fragmentation. Such internal weakness can trigger hostile actions by potential or actual adversaries" [Edward Azar and Chun-in Moon, 1988: 281]

Premised on the foregoing analysis, this study posits that since the realist approach to security failed to capture the Africa's realities, its application

is bound to be misleading. Consequently, there is a need for a redefinition of Africa's security in the light of the contemporary global transformation.

Analysing africa's security milieu during the cold war.

It is apparent that most African countries gained their political independence in the 1960s. This period coincided with the height of the Cold War where the US and the former USSR were locked up in a protracted conflict of ideology and hegemony. Apparently, Africa not only affected by, but equally entangled in the ideological war in which the superpowers were propping up, and supporting one African government or the other depending on their ideological inclinations. Thus, during this period, Africa's security environment was highly militarised and a great chunk of African countries' budgets went to defence and armament building, leading to an arms race. Caught in the cobweb of Cold War consternation, African leaders placed military security and by extension regime survival over and above non-military issues. Needless to say, this conceptualisation and the subsequent arms build-up eventually created security dilemma. It is often argued by scholars of security studies that the presence of these instruments of coercion in Africa largely encouraged inter-state conflicts, mainly border conflicts as witnessed in Ethiopia-Somalia, Algeria-Morocco conflicts, etc. Other examples of violence include the Israeli raid on Entebbe [Uganda] in 1976, the external invasion of the Shaba province [Zaire] between 1977/1978, mercenary raids on Comoros in 1978 and Seychelles in 1981 [Elaigwu, 1996: 7-8].

During this period, the major threats to Africa's security have been in the form of insecurity emanating from conflicts between and among states located in the same region or sub-region. These inter-state conflicts, more often than not, assumed alarming proportion consequent on the extra-regional interventions. Inter-state conflicts dominated African political landscape for years while intra-state conflicts were minimal. This hideous political environment provided fertile grounds for the proliferation of military alliances/defence pacts between the colonial overlords and their former colonies, and to a large extent with the superpowers despite the fact

that most African countries are members of the Non-Aligned Movement
[NAM]. Though, the USSR was not, and has never been a colonial power
in Africa, but the wars of liberations in different parts of the continent in
the 1950s through the 1970s especially in the Lusophone states of Angola
and Mozambique empowered Moscow to carve areas of influence for itself.
The sustained militaro-economic supports to the liberation movements and
the newly independent African states, especially regimes favourably dis-
posed to the communist ideology helped to reinforce Moscow's position in
Africa. Reverting to the former imperial powers in Africa, France's influence
in the internal affairs of its erstwhile colonies in Africa was noticeable dur-
ing this period [Ogunmola and Badmus, 2004 and 2005; Rondos, 1979;
Bach, 1986]. Paris not only signed military agreements with the Franco-
phone states but is equally maintaining foreign military bases and above
all continuously intervening in the domestic politics of these countries. In
the 1970s for instance, the French military forces intervened in the Central
African Republic [CAR] by removing the head of state, Jean Bedel Bokassa,
and replacing him with David Daco. For many years, Paris sustained un-
democratic African governments that were favourable to her. Aside from
France's overt interventions in Africa's internal affairs, Britain also signed
similar agreements with some Anglophone States. However, internal popu-
lar opinion worked against, and eventually led to the abrogation of Anglo-
Nigerian Defence Pact. Furthermore, the politico-military situations in the
Horn of Africa [the Horn] in the 1970s clearly show the influence of the Cold
War creating local African conflicts with international connections. In the
Horn, Cold War politics was brought to the fore when Washington was sup-
porting the Haile Sellasie regime in Ethiopia while Somalia was under the
military cover of Moscow during the same period. The change of power in
the two African states led to the shifting in allegiance with the US supports
for Mogadishu while the new government in Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile
Mariam became the new bride of Moscow. Also, Cuban troops, bankrolled
by the USSR, intervened in Angola purposely to ward off South Africa inva-
sion of Angola. Also, Cuba activities in Angola were in support of the Popu-
lar Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA][1].

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[1]   Other liberation movements in Angola during this period were the National Front for the
     Liberation of Angola [FNLA] and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
     [UNITA], see Badmus, 2003, p.26-42.

Consequently, it is possible to argue that alliance formations, in the long run, have never been in the best interest of Africa for they often call for extra-African interventions in the internal affairs of the continent. Aside from the fact of tremendously reducing the capacities of African countries to pursue dynamic and independent foreign and defence policies, the provisions of such defence pacts have been invoked on a number of occasions by foreign powers to rescue dictatorial governments that were regarded as stooges of the Western powers as the Congo experience in the 1960s and American supports for Mobutu's Zaire proved. Furthermore, the involvement of the new states in superpower ideological politics, according to Olusegun Obasanjo [1993: 52], "aggravated their internal conflict and encouraged instability. Besides, the readiness of the superpowers and their allies to supply arms to Africa encouraged unnecessary arms build-up in the new states and diverted resources meant for development to unproductive and wasteful ends". To this end, the dichotomisation of international politics as well as the extension of the proxy wars to Africa had enabled African leaders to view vital issues in Cold War prismatic lens and eventually treated them as such. The effects of the Cold War on Africa will be much more appreciated within the context of the Organisation of African Unity [OAU]. The OAU, the predecessor of the African Union [AU], for so many years, was fraught with difficulties in taking vital decisions and failed on so many occasions to reach consensus on issues dealing with Africa's political and socio-economic development, thus, mortgaging Africa's future as well as making the continent fail on many instances to speak with one voice at international fora.

If the picture painted above is disheartening, the impacts of the Cold War on Africa's socio-economic developments are even more disturbing. African states were ushered into the international system as passive participants and in an unequal exchange relations, the continent economic picture during the period can be described, according to Olusegun Obasanjo, by the 4 D's: derelict, despondent, disillusioned, and detached from the mainstream of the global economy. Most of Africa's socio-economic indicators according to Obasanjo's [1993: 53], "depict the continent as losing its shares in world trade and manufacturing, even as its relative

global proportions of such negative indices such as poverty, infant and maternal mortality and illiteracy are increasing. The most visible indices of Africa's increasing marginalisation are its sharply declining shares in world exports, imports, foreign direct investment and official development assistance. The persistent deterioration of Africa's terms of trade is also an index of relative regional deterioration. Unbearable external debt burden is another graphic measure of Africa's deteriorating global position" [Also, see Badmus, 2006]. The negative image painted above became a bane to the continent's development and unfortunately hampered Africa's position during the Cold War period.

Africa's security environment in the post-1989 international system

With the advent of *glasnost and perestroika* in Gorbachev's USSR, the fall of the Berlin Wall, coupled with the collapse of communism, the Cold War induced ideological blocs crumbled with the emergence of a new structure of unipolar authority constructed around the US and its allies in the West, and the triumph of capitalism. These developments were accompanied by the popular pressure for political liberalisation, and the quest for democratic governance became heightened. The events and the quest for political liberalisation had far reaching implications for Africa in many aspects, viz, security, economy, politics, etc. The end of the Cold War, first of all, brought about a new security environment that exposed the autocratic African leaders and their regimes to danger. Africa became, during this period, less attractive to their former military/financial backers. As such, with the dwindling financial and military supports for the corrupt and dictatorial African regimes, then their survival became difficult in the face of the ever rising popular pressure for democratisation [Badmus, 2006]. The post--Cold War African security environment has always been characterised by all forms of threats to state security from *within* rather than from outside the territorial integrity of the state, implying that the threats to most nations, individual, and communities, particularly in Africa, do not derive from their neighbour's army but the challenges come from economic collapse/declining Gross Domestic Product [GDP], the dependence of an economy on extractive mineral resources,

political oppression, the inequality of access of groups to political and economic resources, scarcity, over-population, damage to the environment, terrorism, crime, and disease [Olonisakin, 1999]. Since 1989, Africa has been witnessing astonishing waves of identity movements constructed around ethnicity, religion, etc and their mobilisation to achieve parochial goals. Let it be clearly understood that the construction and mobilisation of these identities are not *at all times* antithetical to democracy except in a situation where they are violently utilised as instrument of change to achieve particularistic, rather than universalistic, goals.

The recession of inter-state conflicts in the post-Cold War Africa's international relations has brought forth a new security thinking that centers on 'human-being' security. This implies that comprehensive security thinking should focus on human-being. This is usually referred to as *people's centered security approach*. The kernel of this approach is that it sees human security as human-beings free from hunger and fear, etc. *Thus, human security equals human well being*. This new thinking in security debate emphasises the imperative of democracy and good governance, for stable democracies are relatively peaceful compared to the authoritarian states. Thus, there is the need to adequately address the causes of human insecurity which are located in the interrelationship between security on the one hand, and development and governance on the other. This concept, according to Andrew [2002:4] has attracted scholarly attention in recent years for a variety of reasons:

1. The increased attention being paid to human rights in the post-Cold War era, particularly in the North. The core human rights agenda and that of human security overlap to a considerable degree.
2. The rise of the highly contested doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention, which seek to protect civilians from genocide and other gross violation of human rights [sometimes perpetrated by their own governments].
3. The fact that interstate war–the traditional focus of realist conceptions of security–has become increasingly rare. Today, more than 90% of wars are fought within, not between, states. Here,

defence of borders is not an issue; defence of people's is.
4. Growing awareness of the interrelationships between insecurity, development and governance.

The above argument implies that while strengthening national security against external threats, governments, especially in Africa, should enhance human security. Having discussed Africa's post-Cold War security environment, it is pertinent to address ourselves with this fundamental question: What is the situation of Africa's regional security arrangement. Differently put, how has Africa been able to address the issue of security, democratisation, sustainable and equitable development and good governance? The answers to this constitute our task in the section that follows.

Collective defence and africa's regional security frameworks.

As noted earlier, the conceptualisation of Africa's security during the Cold War was state-centric in orientation whereby premium was placed on hard-core security issues by emphasising the preeminence of regime survival and state security. This notion formed the basis of the OAU Charter in relations to peace and security where African leaders agreed unanimously on the protection of the territorial integrity of their countries and regimes. This denotes that, based on the history of colonial domination, African states developed a security arrangement/ framework that jealously guarded their hard won independence and thereby reluctant to submit their sovereignty to any multilateral institution. This is apparent with regard to the *non-interference in the internal affairs of member-states clause* enshrined in the OAU Charter. At one level one may be tempted to concur with this thinking as appropriate but a rethink will expose the danger in this arrangement. This is because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve human security under this kind of security arrangement [Stedman, 1990]. This is premised on the fact that, since regime security was uppermost in the agenda of the States, the lion share of budget is devoted to armaments; hence the well-being of the citizenry became secondary. To really comprehend Africa's security situations during

and after the Cold war within the context of multilateralism, it will be of utmost importance to look at, in greater illustrative details, the collective defence and security frameworks/mechanisms put forward by both the OAU/AU and the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] that are regional and sub-regional organisations respectively.

A critical analysis of the OAU as an institution reveals that had it been that African leaders supported Kwame Nkrumah's proposal during its formative years, the organisation would have developed effective and appropriate security structure. Nkrumah, one of Africa's foremost nationalist leaders, proposed the formation of an African High Command [AHC]. The logic behind this idea was that, the proponent saw Africa's security concerns as multidimensional and that the institutionalisation of effective AHC would abet the continent to deter external aggressions and, by extension, liberate territories that were then under the shackle of colonialism. Nkrumah's idea transcended military cooperation for he called for the establishment of organic political union of the continent under an "African Union Government" [Olonisakin, 1999: 38–39]. With such a union, writes Olonisakin, "a common defence plan could be developed, as well as a common foreign policy, and, a fully integrated economic programme for the whole continent. If achieved, this political union would serve as deterrence to any foreign intervention, and it would also remove the need of African states to seek protection from outside powers, through the formation of alliances and military pacts". In spite of the noble ideals of this proposal, African leaders that attended the inaugural meeting of the OAU in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, jettisoned Nkrumah's proposal, and excluded it from the OAU Charter. The reasons for this attitude can be located within the context of preserving rather than eroding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of individual African states, and petty nationalism [see Mkwandawire, 1999: 35]. Instead of a political union, leaders' preference for the recognition of colonially inherited borders dominated the meeting. To all appearances, this informed the inclusion of some of general principles of state behaviour in the Charter. In this respect, the Charter provisions include:

* Recognition of the sovereign equality of all member states;
* Non-interference in the internal affairs of member states;
* Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right of independent existence;
* Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; and
* Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighbouring or any other states

Although, these principles helped in no small way in averting many conflicts associated with territorial claims and counter claims, and by extension self-determination, there were other political conflicts that the provisions of the Charter failed to solve as the situation in Western Sahara and the strained relations between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa over Ogaden have showned. While the organisation needs to be commended on these remarkable achievements, the Charter failed to guarantee Africa's security and sustainable peace. This failure can be gleaned from the dissatisfying statistics on Africa's security. It is disheartening to show that during the first year of the organisation [even less than a year], not less than six boundary and territorial disputes had envenomed the continent, viz, the conflicts between Morocco and Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, Morocco and Mali, Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, and between Ghana and Togo. These conflicts, definitely, had devastating effects on these countries as well as neighbouring states [Imobighe, 1989:31].

Another major shortcoming of the OAU Charter is that, it overlooked and did not provide means for tackling internal security threats. This is not because internal threats are inconsequential; rather "it is just that the OAU's attitude is based on minimal interference. The OAU regards these internal crises as lying within the domestic competence of the affected States" [Imobighe, 1989:30]. Apparently, internal security threats, it should be recalled, emanated largely from the repressive policies of the authoritarian leaders in the quest for regime survival. This thrived well because of the 'non- interference' clause in the OAU Charter. It can be argued that while preference for external security was the order of the day

during the Cold War years, Africans were exposed to hunger and fear. This ultimately heightened the demands for freedom and economic security/ guarantee from the citizens. In a nutshell, the adherence to the purposes and principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference apparently hindered the efficacy as well as viability of the OAU to adequately address African intra-state conflicts as the situation in Chad proved. In the case of Chad, it was not until France's intervention, and Libya's military involvement in support of Goukouni Weddeye that the OAU started playing active role in the conflict. Although, President Muamar Ghaddafi's justification that his actions were based on a defence pact signed with N'djamena in June 1980 was not accepted. Thus, the OAU saw and considered the Chadian civil conflict as one with external colouration.

> Turning to the West African sub-region, ECOWAS [the Community] is fortunate to have taken non-military issue [economic security] as it core activity. Established by the Treaty signed on 28 May 1975 in Lagos[2], the reason d'etre for the West African leaders was to promote cooperation and integration for economic growth and development of the sub-region with the overall aim of uplifting the economic well-being of their citizens[3].

To all appearances, the provision of the Article would make one, *prima facie*, to conclude that West Africans have perfectly tackled their economic insecurity/quagmire; rather, this hasty judgment is quite misleading as the reverse is the case. West Africa and nay Africa at large represents the World's 'poorest of the poor' in economic sphere. Why? The not too far-fetched answer is that despite the lofty ideals that formed the basis of ECOWAS' existence, leaders of the sub-region apparently did not place much emphasis on other aspects of security in the organisation's Charter and, to be sure, economic development can hardly be achieved in an environment devoid of security and political stability. The increase in

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[2]   The fifteen signatories to the Treaty of Lagos were: Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, Guinea, Dahomey [now Benin], Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, the Gambia and Upper Volta [Burkina Faso]. Cape Verde joined ECOWAS in 1977. The organisation is now comprised of 15 countries with the withdrawal of Mauritania from the Community in December 2000.

[3]   On the objectives and purpose of ECOWAS, please see Article 2 (1) of the ECOWAS Treaty

disruptive armed insurrections, especially in the Greater Mano River Basin tri-states of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Conakry; Guinea Bissau, and of recent Cote d'Ivoire, attest to this. Consequently, ECOWAS has since recognised the symbiotic relations that exist between regional peace and security and harmonious development of the economies of its member states [James, 1996: 322]. The point we are making here is that strengthening political stability and security is a *sine qua non* to economic development and advancement. Though, attempts were made in the early years of the Community's existence aimed at achieving a conflict-free West Africa. In 1978, the Community adopted the Protocol on Non-aggression[4] where Member States resolved that the Community "cannot attain its objectives save in an atmosphere of peace and harmonious understanding among Member States of the Community". In pursuing this objective, therefore, Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol stipulate that:

> member states shall in their relations with one another, 'refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression, or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity against territorial integrity or political independence of other member states', and to 'refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member States'.

While one would agree that the 1978 Protocol represents a giant stride towards achieving sub-regional peace and security, the Protocol is fraught with difficulties. It is true that the Protocol is a form of collective security envisioned by the UN Charter but it failed to, first, create institutional and administrative frameworks for dealing with the prohibited acts of aggression, and second, it recommended pacific settlement of disputes between ECOWAS member states in line with the means provided in the Protocol. Olonisakin, while commending ECOWAS for the right step in an equally right direction, contends that the type of collective security provided by the Protocol is at variance with that of the UN in the sense that "whilst the

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[4]   *ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression,* 22 April 1978, ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja. Also see Badmus [n.d].

collective security systems envisaged under the UN and earlier systems implied the collective use of force against a member state that committed an act of aggression, the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression stopped short of an enforcement option. Instead it recommended the peaceful settlement of disputes…" [Olonisakin, 1999: 40]. This Protocol was perfected with the signing of a Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense [MAD] on 29 May 1981 in Freetown, Sierra Leone[5].

Article 2 of the 1981 Protocol categorically states that, "any armed threat or aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the Community". This forms the keystone of the Protocol. In Article 3, it is further stressed that, "member states resolved to give mutual aid and assistance to each other for defence, against any armed threat or aggression". Furthermore, in the case of armed conflict between two member states of the Community, Article 4 empowers the Authority of ECOWAS to decide to interpose Allied Armed Forces of the Community [AAFC] between the troops engaged in the conflict. Article 18 empowers ECOWAS to invoke Articles 6, 9, and 16 to intervene in a situation that a domestic conflict in a member country is actively maintained and sustained from outside.

Before going further, West African leaders must be commended for adopting the 1981 Protocol but it is not without shortcomings. First, a careful analysis of the various provisions of the Protocol's Articles shows that the Protocol devoted much more attention to threats that are external to the sub-region while internal security concerns were relegated to the background. Though, Article 18 (2) states that, "Community Force shall not intervene if the conflict remains purely internal", but the fact still remains that the quintessence of the MAD is to guarantee rather than threaten regional security [see Okolo, 1983:177-184; Okolo, 1988: 75]. Consequently, no provision was made for intervention in the internal conflict devoid of external connection in any member state. This is

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[5]   See A/SP3/5/81. "Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence", done at Freetown, 29 May 1981. *Nigeria Treaties in Force, 1970—1990,* p. 898—908. Also see Ogunmola and Badmus, 2006 for Nigeria's roles in achieving sub-regional peace and security.

treated as purely 'internal affairs' of the country concerned. In spite of these shortcomings, the Protocol provides ample opportunities for collective defence in case of aggression. In *addendum,* it also serves as security for the 'legitimate government' of any member state where a civil conflict is supported from outside, thereby; the Protocol represents a mechanism for upholding national and sub-regional security. The inconsequential treatment and the ways of dealing with internal security threats " which had the potential to grow into serious security problems and thus potential to destabilise the sub-region meant that ECOWAS could not achieve much progress, and that its members were indeed only heading for a security crisis" [Olonisakin, ibid]. Olonisakin is absolutely correct when we realise that many of the post--Cold War conflicts are induced by internal factors ranging from declining Gross Domestic Product [GDP], poverty, the unequal access of groups [ethnic in most cases] to political and economic resources, mis-governance/authoritarianism and its associated vices: lack of accountability, neopatrimonialism, human rights abuse, politics of exclusion, etc. Apparently, the combination of these factors at play led to gradual breakdown of societies and the collapse of some West African States. This distracted ECOWAS from focusing on economic development, especially, with the eruption of civil wars in the sub-region. Furthermore, it is disheartening that the Charter of ECOWAS contained the 'non-interference in internal affairs' clause that definitely protects undemocratic regimes. Though, there is divergence of opinions among scholars as to whether democracy is compatible with development.

Apart from the problems discussed above, numerous difficulties hindered ECOWAS' efforts in achieving most of its objectives. Colonialism has resulted in the bifurcation of West Africa into two opposing divides—Anglophone and Francophone. One of the negative impacts of this bifurcation was the existence of rival groupings, which sought to pursue some of the objectives of ECOWAS [see Duah, 1995: 12-13] Examples of such groupings are legion. First is an exclusive Francophone West Africa economic grouping the *Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest* [West Africa Economic Community] whose final agreement was signed in April 1973 in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. It was inspired by France to coun-

terbalance Nigeria's influence and hegemonic role in West Africa[6]. Second, the *Accord de Non Aggression et d'Assistance en Matiere de Defence* [ANAD], a Francophone West Africa Defence Pact which is muted on the presence of French military bases in Africa and the withdrawal of foreign military forces.

The tragedy that befell Liberia in 1989 exposed the inadequacies and contradictions in the earlier efforts at collective defence arrangement going by the political dissensus and antagonistic politics that envenomed ECOWAS over the deployment of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group [ECOMOG]. The civil war, according to Olonisakin, confirmed the need for:

> a holistic approach to security in West Africa. It showed how unmanaged and unresolved conflict can create serious national and sub-regional security threats. A war that had been waiting to happen (In part shored up by the Cold War system] exploded in Liberia. ECOWAS was first saddled with this, and later with other crises in West Africa. A civil war erupted in Sierra Leone in 1991. The Casamance insurrection in Senegal has slowly escalated, Guinea Bissau, and recently Cote d'Ivoire was thrown into turmoil. Together, the crises in the sub-region have resulted in millions of refugees and displaced peoples, while diverting attention from the greater goals of stability and development

Rethinking regional security frameworks in Africa

The global transformation and complexity of security concerns in the contemporary age have completely discredited the practical relevance and intellectual credibility of the euro-centric, state-centric, geopolitical, and militaristic perspectives of security within the context of various historic forces and events. These historic forces and events include: "the end of the Cold War, global integration of national economies, erosion of national identities and cultures, the shift in priority from military rivalry to eco-

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[6]   See Ogunmola and Badmus 2006.

nomic competition, and the diminishing role of the state as the dominant actor in international politics" [Hague, 2002: 24]. Instead, continued Hague, "there have emerged diverse new issues—ranging from poverty to refugee crises, information privacy to cyber-terrorism, environmental problems to natural disasters—which require non-state and non-military policies and strategies". This new security environment has now compelled regional institutions to internally restructure, redefine their objectives, and develop new approaches to regional and sub-regional security in order to effectively face the new security challenges, and perhaps, in the face of the Cold War weariness of the superpowers.

Certainly, the expectation of the international community is that Africa should play prime role in mitigating conflicts on the continent; implying that Africans should take primary ownership of their own problems. Therefore, little wonder why the erstwhile OAU Scribe, Salim Ahmed Salim [1995] asserted that the organisation needs to devise "regional solutions to regional problems". This is because of the waning reticence of the international community's involvement in African conflicts and the increasing demands on the UN for peacekeeping missions. Salim believed that this situation should lead to a "greater devolution of responsibility for conflict resolution onto regional organisation such as the OAU" that should include the conduct of peacekeeping operations [cited in Richard Joseph, 1997:11]. Echoing Salim is the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Boutros-Ghali [1992], in clear terms, emphasized the imperative of the UN/ regional institutions partnership in matters relating to conflict resolution as stipulated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Earlier in 1994, the United States Institute of Peace [USIP] conference on 'the US Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa' recommended that, "Africa should determine under what conditions it is helpful to have the international community engage in conflict resolution efforts". In this respect, a "layered response" strategy was suggested as the appropriate conflict resolution model[7]. On its own, the International Peace Academy [IPA], a New York-based independent international institution devoted to

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[7]   The kernel of this strategy is that it called for the division of labour in conflict resolution, thus: beginning with local organizations, then proceeding to sub-regional, regional, and finally international organisations as a crisis escalates. For detailed discussion, see Vraalsen, 1997.

the study of peace and conflict research, opined that, "the OAU should be the continent's 'first port of call' in dealing with internal conflicts"[8]

Against the background of this shift in paradigm, the OAU/AU has now awakened from its slumber to recognise the need to establish a more systematic and institutionalised approach to conflict prevention and resolution. This transcends its age-old system of *ad hoc* responses that were highly ineffective as the Chadian civil war reminds us. At the 1993 OAU Summit in Cairo, the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution that will enable the organisation to take a more pro-active stance both in inter-- and intra--state conflicts was officially adopted [9]. The kernel of the Mechanism is its emphasis on conflict prevention instead of conflict resolution; implying that the Mechanism seeks to anticipate and prevent conflict situations from developing into full-scale wars. Thus, the African Heads of State and Government succinctly declared that:

> The Mechanism will have as a primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, it will be its responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the resolution of these conflicts. In this respect, civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration may be mounted and deployed. In setting these objectives, we are fully convinced that prompt and decisive action in these spheres will, in the first instance, prevent the emergence of conflicts, and where they do inevitably occur, stop them from degenerating into intense or generalised conflicts. Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures, and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to resort to the complex and resource-demanding peace-keeping operations, which our countries will find difficult to finance[10].

[8] See International Peace Academy [IPA], 1994; Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1995.

[9] The road to the adoption of the Mechanism has not been an unproblematic one. The Dakar Summit of 1992 saw the intrigues by some member states against the involvement of the organisation in peacekeeping. See Obasanjo and Mosha, 1992, for interesting discussions on need for rethinking security in Africa.

[10] The Organisation of African Unity, 1993, Annex, "Declaration of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government on the Establishment, Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution", p. 62—63, para. 15.

The Mechanism has profoundly revitalised and enhanced the OAU visibility and impacts in African conflict management. Compared to the pre-1993 era, the OAU has assumed an elevated profile in preventing many Africa's intra- and inter-state conflicts. This is due to the end of the Cold War and the declining external intervention in African conflicts which have prompted African states to exploit the OAU's Mechanism to resolve their conflicts [Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000:1]. The Mechanism also empowers the organisation to be involved in issues that were previously regarded as purely domestic affairs of member states. In terms of structure[11], the Mechanism provides for two main organs: the Central Organ and Conflict Management Division [later renamed the Conflict Management Center]. Modeled on Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government [the Bureau], the Central Organ is the decision-making body of the Mechanism. It comprises sixteen countries elected annually on the basis of geographical representation[12]. Being the Mechanism decision-making body, the Central Organ is tasked with the responsibilities of considering issues before the organisation especially those affecting peace and security, and offering the OAU Secretary-General with the required political leadership to commence appropriate actions to address these issues[13]. In this respect, the Mechanism sees both the Secretary-General and the Conflict Management Center as its operational arm. While supporting the Secretary-General in implementing the strategies to achieve the lofty goals of the Mechanism, the Conflict Management Center is specifically responsible:

i) Collect, collate, and disseminate information relating to current and potential conflicts on the continent;

ii) Prepare and present policy option to the OAU Secretary-General on how best to address current and potential conflicts, and supporting the Secretary-General in the presentation of OAU decisions in the area of conflict management;

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[11] This study is not interested in extensive discussion of the Mechanism's structure. Instead, the analysis of its performance in conflict prevention and resolution is imperative to comprehend its effectiveness or otherwise in Africa's international relations.

[12] Memberships include the States of the outgoing and incoming OAU Chairmen. This is important to provide for a flawless transition.

[13] For more discussion on the Central Organ and its slight divergence from the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of state and Government, see Berman and Sams, 2000, p. 63-64.

iii) Undertakers or commission analysis and long-term research into the root causes of conflicts and their implications for conflict prevention and peace-building efforts; and

iv) Support and manage political, civilian, and military observer and monitoring missions, and coordinate regional training policies to support peacekeeping operations.

Apart from the two important organs identified above, the Mechanism also created an OAU Peace Fund; a separate source of finance to assist its conflict prevention and resolution efforts. With the establishment of the Peace Fund, it is hoped that the perennial financial crisis that is associated with the OAU will be a thing of the past. The Peace Fund has impacted positively on developing the human and materials resources of the Conflict Management Center, which, going by the Mechanism, should reinforce the position of the Secretary-General. Apart from this, it has also provided avenues for the international community especially the West to control the OAU's agenda and to support its peacekeeping activities. Though, the Peace Fund has to raise revenue from African and external sources, Muyangwa and Vogt [2000:1] contend that three issues have become obvious since its inception. These include, first, "the conflict management needs of the continent have far outweighed the resources of the Peace Fund; second, the failure of member states to meet their financial obligations has hindered the work of the Mechanism; and third, if the Mechanism is to be successful, then the Peace Fund must be financed on a regular and long-term basis"[14]. Nevertheless, the Fund has raised the OAU financial standing. Between 1993 and 1998, it was able to raise $ 28 million, while the fixed 5% of the organisation's budget was increased to 6% from the 1998-1999 fiscal year.

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[14] These scholars are absolutely correct going by the dissatisfying available OAU financial statistics. As at June 1998, the debt of the organisation stood at $48 million, while only 20 member states met their financial obligations. The organisation's finance worsened in the subsequent years. In May 2000, only 22 of the 53 members paid in full and the total arrears amounted to $48.8 million. See Berman and Sams, 2000, p. 65; for analysis on the 1997/98 OAU fiscal year, see Vogt, 1999, p. 319.

Since the establishment of the Mechanism, the OAU has applied it to many conflict situations with varying degrees of success[15]. In this respect, this paper only discusses two of these conflicts; the secessionist crisis in the Grande Comoros and Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. The secessionist crisis that erupted in the Grande Comoros in August 1997 saw active involvement of the OAU. The organisation was directly involved by sending a special envoy, Mr. Pierre Yere and later ministerial delegation to pacify the separatists on Anjouan and Moheli Islands[16]. These efforts led to peace talks between the government and the separatists. The talks, described by the international observers and Western media as success, led to an agreement for inter-island conference to "determine the institutional framework within which the legitimate concerns of the people on the island would be addressed, and to the establishment of a follow-up mechanism to be chaired by the OAU" [Muyangwa and Vogt, 2000:12]. The failure of diplomatic solution to the crisis and the unilateral declaration of independence by Anjouan from the Grande Comoros compelled the OAU through its Central Organ to opt for the deployment of a 24-person peacekeeping mission, named Observer Mission in the Comoros [OMIC], in August 1998 to act as a confidence-building mechanism and to monitor the deteriorating politico-military situation in that country [Cornwell, 1998: 57-58]. The inter-island conference eventually took place in Madagascar and led to the Antananarivo Agreement.

One fundamental impact of the OAU involvement is that the Agreement provided the islands of Anjouan and Moheli with greater autonomy instead of independence, and introduced a three-year rotating presidency

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[15] Here, this study assesses the performance of the OAU in resolving those conflicts by stressing the various tools utilised under the Mechanism. Prominent among these involvement were: [1] Neutral Military Observer Group 1(NMOG 1), Rwanda, 1991—July 1993; [2]. Neutral Military Observer Group II (NMOG II), Rwanda, August –October 1993;[3]. OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB), December 1993-July 1996; [4]. OAU Mission in Comoros (OMIC I) October 1997-May 1998; [5] Joint Monitoring Commission (DRC), November 1999—November 2000; [6]. OAU Mission in Comoros II (OMIC II), December 2001—February 2002; [7]. OAU Mission in Comoros III (OMIC III), March-May 2002; [8]. OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE) August 2000—Onward, see Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa website, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/backround/cssdca.html [Accessed April 2003]

[16] Anjouan and Moheli are two of the four islands forming the Grande Comoros.

among the islands The refusal of the Anjouanese delegation to sign the Antananarivo Agreement coupled with the accompanied political violence and the coup d'etat of April 1999, the Comorian peace process was eventually derailed. This led to the withdrawal of the OAU military observers, while the civilian component of OMIC continued to re-establish peace dialogue. The OAU spent greater part of 2000 to reinvigorate the peace process and maintain its stand of not compromising on the unity and territorial integrity of the Grande Comoros. One striking point here is that with the OAU Mechanism in force, the pan African institution was able to intervene and directly involve in the internal affairs of a member state that was in distress. The organisation was able to secure a peace agreement and to provide, through OMIC, humanitarian assistance when violence erupted.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean inter-state, territorial conflict that erupted in June 1998 ignited another round of complex humanitarian emergencies in Africa. The zenith of the crisis saw mass exodus of refugees and killings of civilian and military personnel alike. The deteriorating political situation compelled both the OAU and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development [IGAD] to intervene to halt the hideous situations. On its part, the OAU established a delegation that studied and eventually proposed a 'Framework Agreement' to achieve cessation of hostilities. The Framework Agreement, endorsed by the OAU Central Organ, was not completely supported by the two protagonists to the conflict due to the 'perceived' inherent dangers in certain aspects of the OAU proposal. While the Central Organ was in the forefront of finding lasting solutions to the crisis, the international community, especially the UN and IGAD supported the diplomatic efforts of the OAU Chairman, Algeria's president Abdelazziz Bouteflika in particular and the OAU as an institution. The mediation efforts of the OAU led to the signing of a peace agreement by the protagonists. The peace agreement eventually paved the way for the deployment of the UN observers to the disputed territory in collaboration with the UN. It is important to note that the active involvement of the OAU encouraged the international community especially the UN to come to Africa's aid.

These case studies reveal that the OAU, via its Mechanism, has uti-
lised quite a number of measures to address the conflict situations in
Africa. Ranging from direct intervention/mediation, application of politi-
cal pressure (including the issuance of strong statements), deployment of
special envoys and fact finding missions, as was the case in the Grande
Comoros to the OAU/UN partnership, the organisation has proved itself
relevant in Africa's conflict prevention and management. Notwithstand-
ing, Muyangwa and Vogt [2000: 15] cautioned:

> The performance of the OAU Mechanism has also demonstrated
> that the scale and scope of conflict, juxtaposed against the organi-
> sation's lack of capacity, resources, and experience, is such that the
> OAU does not, at this time, have the capacity to defuse and resolve
> conflicts in Africa by itself. As a result, the question of how best to
> work with other sub-regional and extra-regional entities for the pur-
> poses of managing African conflicts is one that has preoccupied the
> OAU since the establishment of its Mechanism in 1993. While some
> level of cooperation exists between the OAU, the UN and Africa's
> sub-regional organisations, the OAU has sought to strengthen this
> cooperation. One critical issue in the OAU's efforts to strengthen
> cooperation with these organisations has been the need to clarify
> the division of labour among the UN, international donors, the OAU,
> Africa's sub-regional organisations and its civil society groups.

Muyangwa and Vogt are right in their comments on the performance
of the OAU Mechanism. Despite the promises of the Mechanism and the
organisation's efforts to resolve conflicts in Africa, it is discovered that the
OAU Mechanism became highly ineffective in the face of the political cum
socio-economic realities of the continent at the epoch. Truly, the Mecha-
nism became marginalised throughout Africa. The organisation's lack of
financial, technical and other resources rendered it powerless in resolv-
ing these conflicts on an enduring basis. While at the same time nothing
can be said of its involvements in conflicts in Angola, Great Lakes Region,
Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, etc. Even in situations where the
OAU intervened, no serious peace operations were ever mounted. Appar-
ently, the OAU Mechanism's involvement in African conflict "rendered

few results apart from expressing a number of 'concerns' over the lack of progress in implementing certain peace processes" [Mlambo, 2006: 43][17]. In addition, it was clear that in the 1990s, even under the Mechanism's regime, the continental body adopted a carefree attitude in protracted conflict situations. This is because the OAU permitted the UN to handle the resolutions of these conflicts rather than supporting the UN peace missions in Africa.

The transformation of the OAU into the African Union [AU] in Durban in July 2002 led to the overhaul of the continental body, especially in the sphere of peace and security. The First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU Heads of State and Government adopted the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council [PSC] of the AU purposely to correct the flaws inherent in, and replace the OAU Mechanism. This was in accord with the decision of the Heads of state and Government of the OAU at their 37th Ordinary Session held in July 2001 in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. The Lusaka meeting "agreed on the incorporation of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention as one of the organs of the AU, in line with Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, in addition to creating the principal organs of the AU, allowed for the creation of 'other organs that the Assembly may decide to establish' " [Mlambo, 2006: 44][18]. Essentially, the PSC is to:

- promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;
- anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for the resolution of these conflicts;
- promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence;

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[17] See Baregu and Mlamo, 2000 for extensive discussion on the OAU Inaction in Angola.

[18] Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 5(2), adopted at Lome, Togo, on 11 July, 2000

- co-ordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects;
- develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act;
- promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts [19].

It is self-evident through a perusal of the Constitutive Act of the AU and the objectives of the PSC that the African leaders are now much more determined to realise a peaceful and stable Africa. Undoubtedly, the establishment of the PSC as a decision-making body for conflicts prevention, management and their resolutions is a novel attempt to secure Africa from the scourges of war. This is because it is a comprehensive and an all-encompassing approach to conflict prevention and management. It is a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict situations in Africa[20]. The AU Peace and Security Council, that enjoys the supports of the AU Commission, an African Standby Force [ASF], the AU Early Warning System [EWS], a Special Fund, etc[21] also deals with matters relating to post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction, disasters' management, preventive diplomacy, humanitarian actions, etc.

One remarkable achievement of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council is the creation of the African Standby Forces [ASF]. In line with the Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 13 (1) and (2) of the Protocol empowers the PSC to ASF composed of,

> standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.
>   – For that purpose, the Member States shall take steps to es-

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[19]   see Article 3 of the African Union's Protocol Establishing Peace and Security Council
[20]   Ibid, Article 2(1)
[21]   Ibid, Article 2(2)

tablish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the Peace and Security Council or intervention authorized by the Assembly. The strength and types of such contingents, their degree of readiness and general location shall be determined in accordance with established African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations.

It is believed that the existence of ASF will enable the AU to respond as earlier as possible to African crises and save the grave situations especially when the UN is not interested to intervene, and/or have been long delay in responding to African conflicts[22].

Towards a holistic and effective africa's security arrangement

At the 1991 OAU Summit in Abuja, Nigeria, the African Heads of State and Government acknowledged the fact that, "there is a link between security, stability, development and cooperation in Africa", and the continent needs to move as quickly as it can to achieve its own 'Helsinki Agreement'. Then the question is: how can Africa achieve this objective and overcome its security challenges. In providing the appropriate model for the continent to overcome its security nightmare, this study utilises a framework developed by Ishola Williams, a retired general from the Nigerian army. According to General Ishola, there are 3 multilateral instruments in contemporary Africa that serve as reference point for achieving both military and non-military security. These, according to Ishola, include the African Union [AU], the New Partnership for African Development [NEPAD], and the Calabashes for Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation [CSSDCA][23].

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[22] The creation of the PSC and ASF has impacted on Africa's security. These impacts are discussed exhaustively in a similar work by the author under the title, The Quest for Security After the Cold War: Africa's Security Concerns

[23] Under the CSSDCA, the African Union [AU] was known as the Organisation of African Unity [OAU]. The OAU has now been transformed into the AU.

CSSDCA and The Kampala Process/Document

The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s did not result in a peace dividend for Africa. Instead, there was an increase in intrastate conflicts, some of which resulted from the democratisation processes that were co-terminus with the end of the Cold War. There was also an increase in resource-based conflicts not only in Africa, but also elsewhere in the Third World. At the sametime, in the early 1990s the international community tended to marginalise the African continent, and the United Nations Security Council showed less interest in resolving African conflicts. Recognising the changes within the international arena, the OAU Heads of State and Government Summit of 1990 resolved that African governments would work together for the peaceful and rapid resolution of all conflicts on the African continents. As a follow up to this, in May 1991, African Heads of State and government held a special meeting in Kampala, to discuss security, stability and development on the African continent. The resulting Kampala Document proposed a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa [CSSDCA]. This Document also highlighted the need for four interrelated "calabashes", which included:

- The **Security calabash**, to focus on the principles and modalities for inter-state relations;
- The **Stability calabash**, on the need for democratisation, good governance and popular participation within member states;
- The **Development calabash**, on strategies to raise and improve general standards of living; and,
- The **Cooperation calabash**, on the modalities for accelerating regional integration processes and harmonising development of vital sectors of the continent

The Kampala Document was not presented to the Summit of Heads of State and was therefore never tabled for adoption. However, the Kampala process continued to be discussed at the Ministerial level. In September 1999, at the OAU Extraordinary Summit held in Sirte, Libya, the Heads of State decided to convene

an African Ministerial Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation. The first Ministerial CSSDCA meeting was therefore held in Abuja, from 8-9 May 2000. Later the same year, the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Lome, Togo, in July 2000, adopted the Solemn Declaration on the CSSDCA and established a CSSDCA Standing Conference of Heads of State that would convene every two years during the Summit. The first CSSDCA Standing Conference took place in Durban, in July 2002, during the Summit of Heads of State, which transformed the OAU into the African Union [AU] and also adopted the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council.

Adapted from Mlambo, 2006, p. 42.

These three instruments, coupled with Africa's various sub-regional institutions' instruments, are intended to address the security challenges facing the continent. It is disheartening that the linkage between and among these instruments and their individual conflict prevention mechanisms are weak. Then in order to overcome this problem, General Ishola suggested the development of the AU and sub-regional Common Human Security and Foreign Policy objectives implemented under the CSSDCA umbrella [See the Diagram below]

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                        ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                        │           CSSDCA            │
                        │ (Common Human Security and  │
                        │       Foreign Policy)       │
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CSSDCA
(Common Human Security and Foreign Policy)

(Social)   (Economic

Security and Stability   **FOR**   **Development and Cooperation**

(Political & Institutional)

AU Peace and Security Council   **AU ECOSOC**   NEPAD

Sub-regional Mechanisms   **REGIONAL ECOSOC**   SUB-REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES

Conflict Zones e.g. Great Lakes & Mano River

National State Safety and Security Structure Including Private Safety Organisations; Community Safety; Personal Safety   **NATIONAL ECOSOCS**   NATIONAL ECONOMIC GROUPS

Source: Williams, Major General [Rtd.] Ishola, 2003. p. 3

For us to really fathom the framework developed by General Ishola, it is of striking importance to revisit the salient features of the CSSDCA. The first pillar of the CSSDCA is the security of the African people, their land and property and their states as a whole because it is a condition for stability, development and cooperation in Africa. Accordingly, the CSSDCA **Security Calabash** is anchored on some key principles to be adhered to by African states, viz, conflict prevention and containment; internal and external security for Africa must derive from a framework of common and

collective continental security; African governments must individually and collectively be guided by the principle of good neighbourliness and a peaceful resolutions of conflicts, etc. The security calabash also calls for the continental peacekeeping outfit as a vital instrument for the preservation of peace in instances which potentially or actually threaten the security of the continent as a whole; and the need for confidence building measures between and among African states to cover issues such as joint military training, joint studies, etc. To create and maintain intra- and inter-African tranquility, it is recommended that an African Peace Council [APC] be created within the framework of the OAU and be "empowered under the CSSDCA and given discretion to effect a measure of intervention in national security problems of participating member states and determine appropriate actions which may involve reconciliation and mediation or recommendation of deployment of African peacekeeping operation or both". *In addendum* to the security calabash, the CSSDCA **Stability Calabash** encourages African government to adhere to the rule of law and ensure popular participation of their citizens in the governance of public affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedom and above all transparency in public policy making. Thus, "African governments will have to initiate, design and implement policy measures, and strengthen institutions which adjudicate disputes, resolve conflicts and attenuate the possibility of violence".

With this framework, it is suggested that African states should be able to rely on regional mechanisms to ensure their 'internal security' as the collective human security policy stipulated before feeling the need to approach the UN. This collective human security and foreign policy would, according to General Ishola:

> Carry implications for the organisation and structure of the military and police, ensuring that they are suitably equipped for activities such as robust peace missions, military humanism, and cross-border activities. The importance of such common policy is indispensable because... it will also encourage national safety measures to be developed at the state level with the assurance that sub-regional security arrangements deliver these mechanisms in practice.

General Ishola continues:

While most of the conflicts of the last two decades have been fuelled by national causes they have also engaged regional and international interests. Thus, it is important to resolve this conflict using regional approaches or 'zones of interest' in order to deal with internal and external dimensions of these deadly crises. This is particularly the case with conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC], Burundi, Rwanda, all of which are linked to East Africa, a region that has many subsequent links with the Horn of Africa and Central Africa----'zones' which are often neglected in the conflict resolution strategies.

This framework will definitely encourage the Civil Society Organisations [CSOs] to work in 'zones' instead of on 'country to country' basis. With this development, CSOs can play fundamental roles in bringing the failed peace accords back to life by encouraging signatories to such agreements and neighbouring states to live up to their commitments through focused monitoring and lobbying strategies. Additionally, CSOs can serve as a bridge between the civilian population and their governments. They could work closely with the people to identify their daily security quagmires while the feedback from such endeavours will help governments in devising appropriate strategies to achieve safety and security and what resources may be required.

Turning to non-military security issues, the CSSDCA's **Development Calabash** encourages Africa to subscribe to some basic principles in order to fashion a common direction of development. Some of these principles are:

1. Development based on self-reliance is the only viable basis—in Africa's circumstances—for the internationalisations of a self-sustaining economic growth on the continent.
2. Rapid physical and economic integration of the African continent is a *sine qua non* to Africa's economic survival in the 21st century and prospects for socio-economic transformation and competitiveness with the rest of the world.

3. Reliance on commodity production solely for export has been one of the major causes of Africa's economic crisis. Effective diversification both horizontally in terms of broadening the production based and vertically with respect to processing and marketing is imperative for the socio-economic transformation of the African economies.

4. Popular participation and equal opportunity and access must be promoted and sustained as a crucial basis for the realisation of Africa's development objectives and strategies.

Furthermore, the development calabash, often describes as the *raison d'etre* for the CSSDCA process, seeks to achieving a development process that epitomizes the African person. In creating a truly citizen-centered development, the CSSDCA process aims at optima harmonisation of the energies and initiatives of people by unlocking and developing their capacity for imagination and developing their ability to participate in the definition and implementation of development goals.

From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that for Africa to truly attain a people-centered development there is an urgent need for human resources development. It is clear that one of the hindrances to Africa's development is the inadequate human capabilities. Thus, the CSSDCA process accords priority to the *relevant elements* of the Khartoum Declaration on Human Centered Development and the Mauritius Declaration on Education. Furthermore, it also pays attention to special issues such as research and development [R&D]; improvement in the quality of education; science and technology education. Other areas of policy measures include efforts towards a comprehensive development of African entrepreneurial capabilities and encouragement of technical cooperation among African states; finance resource mobilisation; agricultural development for food self-sufficiency; energy, industrial, trade, transport and communication developments, etc.

Turning to the **Cooperation Calabash**, the CSSDCA process recommends cooperation at three levels, viz,

1. Among African countries—using bilateral and multilateral agreements and the existing sub-regional economic grouping as building blocks towards the achievement of an African Economic Community.
2. South-South cooperation which Africa should pursue to achieve more fruitful results; and,
3. North-South cooperation.

The cooperation calabash, according to the Kampala Document [1991] is also guided by certain pivotal principles that are to be strictly adhered to by all member states:

'Economic integration: African countries cannot expect to compete or develop individually, in the evolving international economic system dominated by regional economic blocs. Economic integration should be intensified and a shortened timetable for the African Economic Community should be agreed upon. Economic integration should be fostered by the free movement of people

'Interdependence: African countries must seek to explore opportunities for beneficial cooperative relations with other developing and industrialised nations.

African countries will need to collectively act jointly in developing their common natural resources.

'Supranationality: As African countries foster cooperation and integration, the need for devolving certain key responsibilities to continental institutions would be imperative.

All said, it is clear that the CSSDCA Common Human Security and Foreign Policy represents a comprehensive approach to redress Africa's security quagmires and crisis of development. It is highly surprising that most, if not all, of the CSSDCA's objectives have been the major preoccupations of Africa's regional and sub-regional institutions but it is disheartening that the problem with most, if not all, of these institutions is the lack political capacity which apparently hinders their efficacy in tackling Africa's multilayered problems. Undoubtedly, most of the objectives of CSSDCA form the basis of the NEPAD document, while the PSC of the AU is the product of the recommendations of the CSSDCA. For

instance, the NEPAD document represents a holistic, comprehensive, integrated, and strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa [NEPAD, 2001]. Comprehensive document in the sense that it "embraces a broad range of programmes, including those addressing the issues of peace, security, democracy, human rights, good governance, increased access to essential services, bridging the digital divide, regional integration, diversifying the African economy, increased capital flows to the continent and environmental protection" [Loots, 2006: 12]. NEPAD is based on the following principles:

1. African ownership and leadership
2. Anchoring the redevelopment of the continent on the resources and resourcefulness of the African people
3. Accelerating and deepening of regional and continental economic integration
4. New Partnerships with the industrialised world
5. Comprehensive, holistic and integrated development approach [See Dogonyaro, 2002: 323]

Central to the NEPAD document is the mechanisms for a reviewing process in order to ensure that agreed targets and standards are achieved. The process [the African Peer Review Process–APRM] is to monitor and encourage compliance to improve standard of governance [Aning, et al, 2004: 1].

In the same vein, the 'rebirth' of the African continent with the transformation of the OAU into the AU is a political expression of African leaders' will to pose and resolve unanimously the problem of continental integration as a prerequisite for Africa's harmonious development. The basic challenge to the African continent now is how its leaders can improve governance in order to create the enabling environment and conditions for growth and development, both through the continent's own efforts and by attracting greater investment and development assistance from international partners. This would depend on, to a large extent, the level of inter-state and inter-agency collaboration. As stated earlier, the level of collaboration of these current instruments is not strong enough. Previou-

sly, the 'non-interference in the internal affairs of member state' clause in the OAU Charter has, on many occasions, been invoked by autocratic regimes to rescue them from international actions against their mis-governance. This is now things of the past. With the adoption of the Constitutive Act and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of PSC, it is lawful for the AU to intervene in the affairs of member states, "in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" and at the same time, the Protocol allows member states to request for the AU intervention in its quest for the restoration of peace and stability. In this respect, the AU is more determined to collaborate with regional institutions in resolving African conflicts especially going by the composition of the ASF that is relying on the Regional Standby Brigades in the five African regions. Although, the PSC of the AU is still new, it can be argued that it has performed creditably well since its establishment. In collaboration with the AU Commission, the PSC has been able to pressurize the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU to pass germane decisions relating to Africa's Peace and Security of which the "AU Common African Defence and Security Policy [CADSP]" stands out.

On the socio-economic developments and cooperation flanks, undoubtedly, the NEPAD document has well catered for these. Central to the document is the "concept of partnership" denoting the NEPAD is a relationship of partners, of people that share a common future – both positive and negative. The document, apparently, calls for partnership at two levels:

1. Partnership between Africans and among Africans, both as individuals, countries and regional economic communities [RECs]. It is also an invitation by African leaders to the led, to partner with them to create the conditions and environment necessary for development. *That is why the issue of integration, of improving intra-African trade and encouraging trans-border projects are central to NEPAD.* Here the issues of trust and accountability become crucial. African leaders are saying that we have experienced governance and economic decline and have decided that good governance is good for Africa, not because somebody else wants or has demanded it. They are saying that

under the initiative, the ruled are partners, not subjects, and together they forge a common destiny [Italics added].

2. Partnership with the rest of the world: NEPAD provides the platform for Africa to bring the table its contribution to the world—material and human resources, biodiversity, market, etc--- and partners with the rest of the world on terms it considers acceptable [See Dongoyaro, 2002: 324-325].

The 'partnership' [i.e. between and among Africans] calls for by the NEPAD document is purely an indication and recognition by African leaders that the challenges facing the continent requires a coordinated approach; implying that they can never be adequately tackled by individual countries or sub-region. Rather, the solutions to the Africa's multifaceted problems require a perfect collaboration between and among the RECs on the one hand, and between these organisations and the AU on the other. Furthermore, in order to encourage an overall state of mutual consistency among the policies and programmes of, on the one hand, the African Union/NEPAD, Regional Economic Communities [RECs], Member States, Civil Society Organisations [CSOs], and the financial and organised private sector [OPS] in Africa, and on the other hand, the various international institutions, agencies, governments, NGOs and private contractors that constitute the external actors in the Africa's socio-economic development. This will definitely provides the opportunity and a common platform for the diverse range of actors involved in economic development to conceptualise, organise and prioritise policy responses. It will facilitating coherence in the assessment, planning, coordination and monitoring of economic policies by providing a common frame of reference and conceptual base for the broad range of multidisciplinary, multifunctional and multidimensional actors that collectively populate these systems.

A Final Plea

It should be emphasised that African governments have done 'fairly' well in guaranteeing Africa's security, especially going by the post-1993 OAU Mechanism on Conflict Prevention environment, and reinforced with the establishment of the PSC of the AU. Recognising the multi-dimensio-

nal nature of Africa's security and lessening focus on military security is a welcome development. The imperative of sustainable development and socio-economic being of citizenry and people-centered security agenda informed the adoption of the NEPAD document. This having been said, it is well to note that the three instruments, especially the NEPAD document are not an end in themselves, but means to foster accelerated development to better tackle the numerous socio-economic and political problems facing the continent. To really reap the benefits and promises of these instruments, there is the need for strong political will and commitment on the part of the African leaderships as well as strong collaboration and links between and among the three instruments coupled with enhanced roles for the CSOs.

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